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THE PRISONER'SDILEMMAAND MUTUALTRUST: COMMENT
ROBERT L. BIRMINGHAM

IN "On the Meaning of Trust,"' Professor
Held has recently defended the interpretation of the Prisoner's Dilemma game
vigorously criticized by Professor Tullock
in his comment2on three earlier articles by
herself3 and Professors Wolff4 and Thompson.5 Professor Tullock stated: "The error
is a bit subtle. Each of the three articles
begins with a perfectly correct account of
the Prisoner's Dilemma. . . . [A]ll then
make statements implying that the problem
is one of mutual trust. This is simply not
so."6 Professor Held replies: "Along with
others, I have described this problem in
terms of whether or not it is rational to
trust. . . . [I]t seems to me that trust is
most required exactly when we least know
whether a person will or will not do an action. And the Prisoner's Dilemma presents
a paradigm of such a situation."7
In her response, Held relies unduly on a
relatively fruitless definitional discussion of
the term "trust." Her disagreement with
Tullock appears more fundamental although in one sense equally semantic: the
disputants are playing different games. The
Prisoner's Dilemma arises through association of individual utility levels with alternative sentences. The basic matrix assigns
years of imprisonmentas a function of the
choices confronting the parties involved.
The formulation in Figure 1, for example,
is appropriatewhen mutual silence and mutual confession respectively yield incarceration for one year and for six years to each
criminal, while either combinationof differing actions frees the confessing criminal
and results in confinement of his partner
for ten years. Here a and b designate the
actions silence and confession open to players 1 and 2.
a2

Tullock and Held would not dispute this
initial characterization. Their differences
are a product of attempts to translate years
of imprisonment into units of utility. Tullock assumes that the value to each player
of various outcomes is simply a decreasing
function of his period of imprisonment.Application to the resulting schedule of the
tautology that the individual will maximize
his utility yields the traditional equilibrium
of double confession. Tullock correctly concludes: "I may have the most perfect confidence that my fellow criminal will never
confess without in any way affecting the
desirability of my confessing. . . . In general . . . one prisoner's opinion about the
probable behavior of the other is irrelevant
to his own decision, since his payoff will
always be higher if he confesses. . . . The
problem raised by the dilemma is simply
that if both parties make the same decision,
they are better off if that double decision
is 'don't squeal' than if it is 'squeal.' "8
The utilities derived by Held from the
basic imprisonment pattern appear superficially consistent with those used by Tullock. The matrix she adopts, reproducedas
Figure 2, preserves the classic solution.
Moreover, she asserts: "Clearly, if one can
make an accurate prediction either that he
will or that he will not confess, one can
decide in accordance with usual recommendations for rational behavior. . . . If
one can accurately predict that one's fellow
prisoner will confess, the rational course
of action is also to confess, thus minimizing one's losses and avoiding the higher
penalty of not confessing when he does.
On the other hand, if one can accurately
predict that he will not confess, the self-
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DISCUSSION
ishly rational course of action is to confess."9
In this context other statements by Held
seem incongruous:
The interest of the Prisoner'sDilemmasituation, however,is in consideringwhat courseof
action may be deemedto be the rationalone
when one can not know what the other fellow
will do. . . . [I]f the probabilitiesconcerning
the other fellow's behaviorare either totally
unknownor exactly .5, then the problem of
establishingwhich course of action would be
the rationalone is acute.... Whenthe chance
of success is exactly even, and we are confrontedwith a one-shotdecision,shouldwe or
should we not take a chance on furtheringa
common interest while risking an individual
interest ?1
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fessing player. This assumptionhas been
into the matrixof Figure3.
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fromthe
The gamehas beentransformed
Prisoner'sDilemmainto an approachto its
solution.Mutualconfessionis now an obviousequilibriumpositiononly in the sense
that it will be reachedif each playerseeks
to minimizehis maximumloss. If againwe
posit that players1 and 2 keep silent with
probabilitiesx and y, we may write:
E1(x,y)=lOxy-5x

+ 5y-5,

(4)

One would suppose that if rationality compels confession when the other player is
. (5)
E2(x, y)=lOxy + 5x-5y-5
certain to confess or certain to remain si- Hence:
lent, confession would similarly be indicated if his behavior is undetermined. This
d, l ty5,
(6)
y proposition can be simply demonstrated.
Let prisoners 1 and 2 remain silent with
(7)
lE2 10-5.
probabilities x and y, respectively. The exay
pected payoff to each can be written as a
Given the utility schedulesof Figure 3,
function of these probabilities:
Ei(x, y) =

-5x + 15y-5,

E2(x, y) = 15x-

(1)

5y-5.

(2)

-5.

(3)

Thus:
MIl 6E2
OR
=at=

each playercan expect to gain throughsilence so long as the probabilitythat the
otherwill not confessexceeds.5. Here suppositionsof each prisonerconcerningthe
choice to be made by his partnerplay a
crucialrole.
a2

b2

Equation (3) demonstrates that El varies
( 5, 5) ( 5,-5)
al
inversely with x for all values of y, and E2
b1
(-5, 5)
(-5, -5)
varies inversely with y for all values of x.
FIG.4
Therefore player 1 can maximize his expected payoff by setting x equal to 0, while
Furtherreductionof the value of unilatplayer 2 can achieve his best position by eral betrayalor a lesseningof its impact
choosing a similar value for y.11
on the silentpartnercan yield an equilibriConfusion arises because Held tacitly as- um of mutualsilence.The impactof choice
sumes utility to an individual to be a de- by an individualon his expectedpayoffin
creasing function of both his own sentence the gameof Figure4, for example,is indeand the sentence of his partner. Thus she pendentof the probabilityof silenceon the
considers outcomes a1b2 and bja2 not only partof his partner.Thus:
damaging to the silent player but also less
satisfactory than mutual silence to the con(8)
Ei(x),y) = lox-5 5

This content downloaded from 129.079.132.155 on September 11, 2018 12:57:59 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

ETHICS

158

counterbalancing external diseconomies,
however, the community has an interest in
converting the Prisoner's Dilemma game to
ME1E2= 10.
(10)
a game such as that presented in Figure 4.
One mechanism facilitating this transforEach player will profit through selection of mation is the law of contract. If prisoners
alternative a regardless of the behavior of could bind themselves through an agreement not to confess, there would be no
the other.
Where interpersonal comparisonof utili- dilemma. The state, by requiring payment
ties is permissible, outcome a1a2is typical- of damages for breach of certain promises,
ly taken to maximize the value of the Pris- permits individuals to elect such an escape
oner's Dilemma game to the players jointly. in many areas of interaction. Another soluThat their gain through movement from tion, implicit in Held's analysis, would rely
b1b2 to ala2 may be more than offset by on socialization of the individual to induce
consequentloss to other membersof society incorporation of the welfare of others as
is indicated by the story illustrating the an important element in his own preference
game itself and by Tullock's example of a function.
competitive market. Where there are no INDIANAUNIVERSITYSCHOOLOF LAW
E2(x, y) = 1Oy-5
Consequently:

.

(9)
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